This public review includes a call for information on essential patent claims (claims whose use would be required for compliance with the guidance or requirements in this Information Technology Laboratory (ITL) draft publication). Such guidance and/or requirements may be directly stated in this ITL Publication or by reference to another publication. This call also includes disclosure, where known, of the existence of pending U.S. or foreign patent applications relating to this ITL draft publication and of any relevant unexpired U.S. or foreign patents. ITL may require from the patent holder, or a party authorized to make assurances on its behalf, in written or electronic form, either: a) assurance in the form of a general disclaimer to the effect that such party does not hold and does not currently intend holding any essential patent claim(s); or b) assurance that a license to such essential patent claim(s) will be made available to applicants desiring to utilize the license for the purpose of complying with the guidance or requirements in this ITL draft publication either:
i. under reasonable terms and conditions that are demonstrably free of any unfair discrimination; or ii. without compensation and under reasonable terms and conditions that are demonstrably free of any unfair discrimination.
Such assurance shall indicate that the patent holder (or third party authorized to make assurances on its behalf) will include in any documents transferring ownership of patents subject to the assurance, provisions sufficient to ensure that the commitments in the assurance are binding on the transferee, and that the transferee will similarly include appropriate provisions in the event of future transfers with the goal of binding each successor-in-interest.
The assurance shall also indicate that it is intended to be binding on successors-in-interest regardless of whether such provisions are included in the relevant transfer documents.
Such statements should be addressed to: SP-800-133_Comments@nist.gov 1 Introduction 1 Cryptography is often used in an information technology security environment to protect data that 2 is sensitive, has a high value, or is vulnerable to unauthorized disclosure or undetected 3 modification during transmission, storage, or use. Cryptography relies upon two basic 4 components: an algorithm (or cryptographic methodology) and, often, a cryptographic key. The 5 algorithm is a mathematical function, and the key is a parameter used by that function. 6
The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) has developed a wide variety of 7
Federal Information Processing Standards (FIPS) and NIST Special Publications (SPs) to specify 8 and approve cryptographic algorithms for use by the Federal Government. In addition, guidance 9
has been provided on the management of the cryptographic keys to be used with these approved 10 cryptographic algorithms. 11
This Recommendation (i.e., SP 800-133) discusses the generation of the keys to be used with the 12 approved cryptographic algorithms. The keys are either 1) generated using mathematical 13 processing on the output of approved Random Bit Generators (RBGs) and possibly other 14 parameters or 2) generated based on keys that are generated in this fashion. 15 2 Definitions, Acronyms, and Symbols 16
Definitions 17
Approved FIPS-approved and/or NIST-recommended.
Asymmetric key A cryptographic key used with an asymmetric-key (public-key) algorithm. The key may be a private key or a public key.
Asymmetric-key algorithm
A cryptographic algorithm that uses two related keys: a public key and a private key. The two keys have the property that determining the private key from the public key is computationally infeasible; also known as a public-key algorithm.
Bit string
An ordered sequence of 0 and 1 bits.
Ciphertext
Data in its encrypted form.
Compromise
The unauthorized disclosure, modification, or use of sensitive data (e.g., keying material and other security-related information).
Cryptographic algorithm
A well-defined computational procedure that takes variable inputs (often including a cryptographic key) and produces an output.
Cryptographic boundary
An explicitly defined continuous perimeter that establishes the physical bounds of a cryptographic module and contains all the hardware, software, and/or firmware components of a cryptographic module. See FIPS 140. 1
Cryptographic key (key)
A parameter used in conjunction with a cryptographic algorithm that determines its operation in such a way that an entity with knowledge of the correct key can reproduce or reverse the operation, while an entity without knowledge of the key cannot. Examples of cryptographic operations requiring the use of cryptographic keys include:
1. The transformation of plaintext data into ciphertext data, 2. The transformation of ciphertext data into plaintext data, 3. The computation of a digital signature from data, 4. The verification of a digital signature, 5. The computation of a message authentication code (MAC) from data, 6. The verification of a MAC from data and a received MAC, 7. The computation of a shared secret that is used to derive keying material, and 8. The derivation of additional keying material from a keyderivation key (e.g., a pre-shared key).
Cryptographic module The set of hardware, software, and/or firmware that implements security functions (including cryptographic algorithms and keygeneration methods) and is contained within a cryptographic module boundary. See FIPS 140.
Cryptoperiod
The timespan during which a specific key is authorized for use or in which the keys for a given system or application may remain in effect.
Data integrity
A property possessed by data items that have not been altered in an unauthorized manner since they were created, transmitted, or stored.
Decryption
The process of changing ciphertext into plaintext using a cryptographic algorithm and key.
Digital signature
The result of a cryptographic transformation of data that, when properly implemented, provides origin authentication, assurance of data integrity, and supports signatory non-repudiation.
Encryption
The process of changing plaintext into ciphertext using a cryptographic algorithm and key.
Entity
An individual (person), organization, device, or process; used interchangeably with "party."
Entity authentication
The process of providing assurance about the identity of an entity interacting with a system (e.g., to access a resource); sometimes called identity authentication.
Entropy
A measure of the disorder, randomness, or variability in a closed system; see SP 800-90B. 2
MAC key
A symmetric key used as input to a security function to produce a message authentication code (MAC).
Message Authentication Code (MAC)
A cryptographic checksum on data that uses an approved security function and a symmetric key to detect both accidental and intentional modifications of data.
Min-entropy
The min-entropy (in bits) of a random variable X is the largest value m having the property that each observation of X provides at least m bits of information (i.e., the min-entropy of X is the greatest lower bound for the information content of potential observations of X). The minentropy of a random variable is a lower bound on its entropy. The precise formulation for min-entropy is − (log2 (max pi)) for a discrete distribution having probabilities p1, ..., pk. Min-entropy is often used as a worst-case measure of the unpredictability of a random variable.
Module See Cryptographic module.
Nonce
A time-varying value that has (at most) an acceptably small chance of repeating. For example, the nonce may be a random value that is generated anew for each use, a timestamp, a sequence number, or some combination of these.
Origin authentication A process that provides assurance of the origin of information (e.g., by providing assurance of the originator's identity).
Owner 1. For an asymmetric key pair consisting of a private key and a public key, the owner is the entity that is authorized to use the private key associated with the public key, whether that entity generated the key pair itself or a trusted party generated the key pair for the entity.
2. For a symmetric key (i.e., a secret key), the entity or entities that are authorized to share and use the key.
Party
See Entity.
Password
A string of characters (letters, numbers, and other symbols) that are used to authenticate an identity or to verify access authorization. A passphrase is a special case of a password that is a sequence of words or other text. In this Recommendation, the use of the term "password" includes this special case.
Permutation
An ordered (re)arrangement of the elements of a (finite) set; a function that is both a one-to-one and onto mapping of a set to itself.
Plaintext data
In this Recommendation, data that will be encrypted by an encryption algorithm or obtained from ciphertext using a decryption algorithm.
Pre-shared key A secret key that has been established between the parties who are authorized to use it by means of some secure method (e.g., using a secure manual-distribution process or automated key-establishment scheme).
Primitive algorithm
A low-level cryptographic algorithm (e.g., an RSA encryption operation) used as a basic building block for higher-level cryptographic algorithms or schemes (e.g., RSA key transport).
Private key A cryptographic key used with an asymmetric-key (public-key) cryptographic algorithm that is not made public and is uniquely associated with an entity that is authorized to use it. In an asymmetrickey cryptosystem, the private key is associated with a public key.
Depending on the algorithm that employs the private key, it may be used to:
1. Compute the corresponding public key, 2. Compute a digital signature that may be verified using the corresponding public key, 3. Decrypt data that was encrypted using the corresponding public key, or 4. Compute a key-derivation key, which may then be used as an input to a key-derivation process.
Public key A cryptographic key used with an asymmetric-key (public-key) cryptographic algorithm that may be made public and is associated with a private key and an entity that is authorized to use that private key. Depending on the algorithm that employs the public key, it may be used to:
1. Verify a digital signature that is signed by the corresponding private key, 2. Encrypt data that can be decrypted by the corresponding private key, or 3. Compute a piece of shared data (i.e., data that is known only by two or more specific entities).
Public-key algorithm See Asymmetric-key algorithm.
Random Bit Generator (RBG)
A device or algorithm that outputs bits that are computationally indistinguishable from bits that are independent and unbiased.
Randomness extraction
The first step in the two-step key-derivation procedure during which a key-derivation key is produced. The second step in the procedure is key expansion.
Recommendation
A term used to refer to this specific document (i.e., SP 800-133): the "R" is always capitalized.
Rekey
A procedure in which a new cryptographic key is generated in a manner that is independent of the (old) cryptographic key that it will replace.
Salt
As used in this Recommendation, a byte string (which may be secret or non-secret) that is used as a MAC key.
Secret key A cryptographic key used by one or more (authorized) entities in a symmetric-key cryptographic algorithm; the key is not made public.
Secure channel
A path for transferring data between two entities or components that ensures confidentiality, integrity, and replay protection as well as mutual authentication between the entities or components. The secure channel may be provided using cryptographic, physical, or procedural methods or a combination thereof.
Security function
Cryptographic algorithms, together with modes of operation (if appropriate); for example, block ciphers, digital signature algorithms, asymmetric key-establishment algorithms, message authentication codes, hash functions, or random bit generators; see FIPS 140.
Security strength A number associated with the amount of work (that is, the number of basic operations of some sort) required to break a cryptographic algorithm or system. Security strength is often expressed in bits. If the security strength is S bits, then it is expected that (roughly) 2 S basic operations are required to break the algorithm or system.
Shall
This term is used to indicate a requirement of a Federal Information Processing Standard (FIPS) or a requirement that must be fulfilled to claim conformance to this Recommendation; note that shall may be coupled with not to become shall not.
Shared secret
A secret value that has been computed during an execution of a keyestablishment scheme between two parties, is known by both participants, and is used as input to a key-derivation method to produce keying material.
Support a security strength
A term applied to a method (e.g., an RBG or a key with its associated cryptographic algorithm) that is capable of providing (at a minimum) the security strength required or desired for protecting data.
A security strength of s bits is said to be supported by a particular choice of keying material, algorithm, primitive, auxiliary function, parameters (etc.) for use in the implementation of a cryptographic mechanism if that choice will not prevent the resulting implementation from attaining a security strength of at least s bits.
Symmetric key See Secret key.
Symmetric-key algorithm
A cryptographic algorithm that uses the same secret key for its operation and (if applicable) for reversing the effects of the operation (e.g., an HMAC key for keyed hashing or an AES key for encryption and decryption); also known as a secret-key algorithm.
Target data
The data that is to be protected (e.g., a key or other sensitive data).
Trusted Party A party that is trusted by its clients to generate cryptographic keys. 
Acronyms

Symbols and Terms 19
Symbol
Meaning ⊕ Bit-wise exclusive-or; a mathematical operation that is defined as:
The bit string to be determined bLen
The length of the bit string B in bits H(x)
A cryptographic hash function with x as an input K
The key to be determined kLen
The length of K in bits max(x1, …, xn)
The maximum of the xi values min(x, y)
The minimum of x and y; min(x, y) = x if x < y, and min(x, y) = y otherwise ss_K
The security strength that can be supported by the key K ss_Mi
The security strength that can be supported by the combination of the methods used to generate a key Ki, and the methods used to protect it after generation (e.g., during key-transport and/or storage)
T(x, l) Truncation of the bit string x to the leftmost l bits of x, where l ≤ the length of x in bits 3 General Discussion 20
Keys to Be Generated 21
This Recommendation addresses the generation of the cryptographic keys used in cryptography. 22 Key generation includes the generation of a key using the output of a random bit generator (RBG), 23 the derivation of a key from another key, the derivation of a key from a password, and key 24 agreement performed by two entities using an approved key-agreement scheme. All keys shall be 25 based directly or indirectly on the output of an approved RBG. For the purposes of this 26
Recommendation, keys that are derived during a key-agreement transaction (see SP 800-56A and 27 SP 800-56B), derived from another key using a key derivation function (see SP 800-108), or 28 derived from a password for storage applications (see SP 800-132 13 and Section 6.5) are 29 considered to be indirectly generated from an RBG since an ancestor key 14 or random value (e.g., 30
the random value used to generate a key-agreement key pair) was obtained directly from the output 31 of an approved RBG. 32
Two classes of cryptographic algorithms that require cryptographic keys have been approved for 33 use by the Federal Government: asymmetric-key algorithms and symmetric-key algorithms. The 34 generation of keys for these algorithm classes is discussed in Sections 5 and 6, respectively. 35
3.2
Where Keys are Generated 36 Cryptographic keys shall be generated within FIPS 140-validated cryptographic modules. For 37 explanatory purposes, consider the cryptographic module in which a key is generated to be the 38 key-generating module. Any random value required by the key-generating module shall be 39 generated within that module; that is, the RBG (or portion of the RBG 15 ) that generates the random 40 value shall be implemented within the FIPS 140 cryptographic module that generates the key. The 41 generated keys shall be transported (when transportation is necessary) using secure channels and 42
shall be used by their associated cryptographic algorithm within FIPS 140-validated cryptographic 43 modules. 44
Supporting a Security Strength 45
A method (e.g., an RBG or a key and its associated cryptographic algorithm) supports a given 46 security strength if the security strength provided by that method is equal to or greater than the 47 security strength required for protecting the target data; the actual security strength provided can 48 be higher than required. 49
Security strength supported by an RBG: A well-designed RBG supports a given security strength 50
only if the amount of entropy (i.e., the randomness) available in the RBG is equal to or greater 51 than that security strength. The support of a given security strength also requires a commensurate 52 security strength for the confidentiality protection afforded to the entropy bits entered into the RBG 53 (and other parameters determining the RBG's state); when used for the generation of keys and other 54 secret values, a commensurate security strength is also required for the confidentiality and integrity 55 protection that will be provided to the RBG output. For information regarding the security strength 56 that can be supported by approved RBGs, see SP 800-90A. 16 57 Security strength supported by an algorithm: Discussions of cryptographic algorithms and the 58 security strengths they can support given certain choices of parameters and/or key lengths are 59 provided in SP 800-57, Part 1. 17 The security strength of a cryptographic algorithm that uses keys 60 of a certain size (i.e., the key's length) is assessed under the assumption that those keys are 61 generated using an approved process that outputs keys of the requisite size and type while 62
providing an appropriate amount of min-entropy. It is assumed that this key-generation process is 63 capable of supporting security strengths that are equal to or greater than the security strength 64
assessed for the cryptographic algorithm. (Both the min-entropy and the security strength are 65 measured in bits.) 66
Security strength supported by a key: The security strength that can be supported by a key depends 67 on: 1) the algorithm with which it is used, 2) the size of the key (see SP 800-57, Part 1), 3) the 68 process that generated the key (e.g., the security strength supported by the RBG that was used to 69 generate the key), and 4) how the key was handled (e.g., the security strength available in the 70 method used to transport the key). The use of such terms as "security strength supported by a key" 71
or "key supports a security strength" assumes that these factors have been taken into consideration. 72
For example, if an approved RBG that supports a security strength of 128 bits has been used to 73 generate a 128-bit key, and if (immediately after generation) the key is used with AES-128 to 74 encrypt target data, then the key may be said to support a security strength of 128 bits in that 75 encryption operation (for as long as the key is kept secret). However, if the 128-bit AES key is 76 generated using an RBG that supports a security strength of only 112 bits, then the key can only 77 support a security strength of 112 bits even though its length is still 128 bits (i.e., the security 78 strength of the key has been determined by the process used for its generation). 79
4
Using the Output of a Random Bit Generator 80 Random bit strings required for the generation of cryptographic keys shall be obtained from the 81 output of an approved random bit generator (RBG); approved RBGs are specified in SP 800-82 90. 18 The RBG shall be instantiated at a security strength that supports the security strength 83 required to protect the target data (i.e., the data that will be protected by the generated keys). 84
The output of an approved RBG can be used as specified in this section to obtain, for example, 85 either a symmetric key or the random value needed to generate an asymmetric key pair. 86
Asymmetric key pairs require the use of an approved algorithm for their generation. Examples 87 are those included in FIPS 186 for generating DSA, ECDSA, and RSA keys. The generation of 88
asymmetric key pairs from a random value is discussed in Section 5. 89
Methods for the generation of symmetric keys are discussed in Section 6. 90
When random bit strings are required for the generation of cryptographic keys, they are obtained 91 as follows: 92
Let B be the random bit string to be acquired, for example, to use as a symmetric key (K), as input 93
to an asymmetric-key-generation algorithm, or as part of the seed material for an RBG. Let bLen 94 be its desired length in bits. B shall be a bit string that is formed as follows: 95
where 97
• U is a bit string of bLen bits that is obtained as the output of an approved RBG that is 98 capable of supporting the security strength required by the algorithm and/or application 99 using B (e.g., to protect the target data), 100
• V is a bit string of bLen bits, and 101
• The value of V is determined in a manner that is independent of the value of U (and vice 102 versa). 103
The algorithm and/or application with which B will be used and the security strength that B is 104
intended to support will determine the required bit length of B: bLen shall meet the relying 105 application or algorithm's length requirement for a value of the bit string B to be used as intended 106
in support of the targeted security strength. For example, if B is to be used as an AES key, then 107
bLen shall be an approved AES key length that supports the required security strength for 108 protecting the target data. As another example, according to FIPS 186, if B is to be used as a seed 109 in the specified process of generating provably prime factors of an RSA modulus n, then bLen 110
shall be twice the security strength associated with (the bit length of) n. 111
Since there are no restrictions on the selection of V (other than its length and independence from 112 U), a conservative approach necessitates an assumption that the process used to select U provides 113 most (if not all) of the required entropy, which − when measured in bits − cannot exceed the length 114 of U (i.e., bLen). Therefore, the approved RBG from which U is obtained shall be capable of 115 providing the requisite entropy for B during the generation of U (i.e., at least bLen bits of entropy 116 are provided during the seeding of the RBG). 117
The independence requirement on U and V is interpreted in a computational and statistical sense: 118 the computation of U does not depend on V, and the computation of V does not depend on U. 119
Knowledge of the value of V (but not B) must provide no advantage to a party intent on gaining 120
insight into an (as-yet-unknown) value of U. The value of V may be selected using a process that 121 provides little entropy (indeed, V may be assigned a fixed, public value). Nevertheless, in cases 122
where the value of V is intended to be kept secret, knowledge of the value of U (but not B) must 123 yield no additional information concerning the value selected for V. Given that U is the output of 124 an approved RBG, the following are examples of independently selected V values: 125 1. V is a constant (selected independently of the value of U). The value of V may be dependent 126 on the use of B (e.g., if B is used as a key-derivation key, then V may be some value M, but  127 if B is used as a key-wrapping key, then V may be some value N). Note that if V is a string 128 of binary zeroes, then B = U (i.e., the output of an approved RBG). 129 2. V is a key obtained using an approved key-derivation method from a key-derivation key 130 and other input that is independent of U; see SP 800-108. 131 3. V is a key that was independently generated in another cryptographic module. V was 132 protected using an approved key-wrapping algorithm or transported using an approved 133 key-transport scheme during subsequent transport. Upon receipt, the protection on V is 134 removed within the key-generating module that generated U before combining V with U. 135 4. V is produced by hashing another bit string (V′ ) using an approved hash function and (if 136 necessary) truncating the result to the appropriate length before combining it with U. That 137 is, V = T(H(V′ ), bLen) where T(x, bLen) denotes the truncation of bit string x to its bLen 138 leftmost bits. The bit string V′ may be selected using methods 1, 2, or 3 above. 139
Generation of Key Pairs for Asymmetric-Key Algorithms
140
Asymmetric-key algorithms (also known as public-key algorithms) require the use of asymmetric 141 key pairs consisting of a private key and a corresponding public key. A key pair can be used for 142 the generation and verification of digital signatures (see Section 5.1) or for key establishment (see 143
Section 5.2). Each public/private key pair is associated with only one entity; this entity is known 144
as the key-pair owner. Key pairs shall be generated by: 145
• The key-pair owner, or 146
• A Trusted Party that provides the key pair to the owner in a secure manner. The Trusted 147
Party must be trusted by all parties that use the public key. 148
After key-pair generation, the key pair is retained and used by its owner. If the key pair was 149 generated by a Trusted Party, both the owner and any relying party must trust that party not to use 150 the private key of the key pair. The public key may be known by or provided to whomever needs 151 to use it when interacting with the owner (see Section 5.3). 152
Key Pairs for Digital Signature Schemes 153
Digital signatures are generated on data to provide origin authentication, entity authentication, 154 assurance of data integrity, or support for signatory non-repudiation. Digital signatures are 155 generated by a signer using a private key and verified by a receiver using a public key. The 156 generation of key pairs for digital signature applications is addressed in FIPS 186 for the DSA, 157
RSA, and ECDSA digital signature algorithms. 158
Values of B, computed as shown in Section 4, shall be used to provide the random bit strings used 159
in key-pair generation, as specified in FIPS 186. The maximum security strength that can be 160 supported by the resulting key pairs depends on a variety of size and parameter choices. Guidance 161 on the size/parameter choices appropriate for supporting various security strengths can be found 162 in SP 800-57, Part 1. 163
For example, SP 800-57, Part 1 states that an ECDSA key pair generated using an appropriate 164 elliptic curve and a base point whose order is a 224-bit to 255-bit prime number can support (at 165 most) a security strength of 112 bits. FIPS 186 specifies that for such ECDSA key pairs, the 166 random value used to determine a private key must be obtained using an RBG that supports a 167 security strength of 112 bits. Using the method in Section 4, a random value B that is to be used 168 for the generation of the private key is determined by U (a value of a specified bit length obtained 169 from an RBG that supports a security strength of at least 112 bits) and V (which could be zero). 170
The value of B is then used to determine the private key from which the public ECDSA key is 171 obtained, as specified in FIPS 186. 172
Key Pairs for Key Establishment 173
Key establishment includes both key agreement and key transport. Key agreement is a method of 174 key establishment in which the resultant secret keying material is a function of information 175 contributed by all participants in the key-establishment process (usually only two participants) so 176 that no party can predetermine the value of the keying material independent of any other party's 177 contribution. For key-transport, one party (the sender) selects a value for the secret keying material 178
and then securely distributes that value to one or more other parties (the receiver(s)). 179
Approved methods for generating the asymmetric key pairs used by approved key-establishment 180 schemes between two parties are specified in SP 800-56A (for schemes that use finite-field or 181 elliptic-curve cryptography) and SP 800-56B (for schemes that use integer-factorization 182 cryptography, such as RSA). 183
Values of B, computed as shown in Section 4, shall be used to provide the random values 19 needed 184 to generate key pairs for the finite field or elliptic curve schemes in SP 800-56A or to generate key 185 pairs for the integer-factorization schemes specified in SP 800-56B. The maximum security 186 strength that can be supported by the approved key-establishment schemes and the key sizes used 187 by these schemes is provided in SP 800-57, Part 1. 188
Distributing the Key Pairs 189
A general discussion of the distribution of asymmetric key pairs is provided in SP 800-57, Part 1. 190 Key pairs may either be static or ephemeral. Static key pairs are intended to be used multiple times; 191 ephemeral keys are usually used only once. 192
The private key of a key pair shall be kept secret. It shall either be generated 1) within the key-193 pair owner's cryptographic module (i.e., the key-pair owner's key-generating module) or 2) within 194 the cryptographic module of an entity trusted by the key-pair owner and any relying party not to 195 misuse the private key or reveal it to other entities (i.e., the key pair is generated within the key-196
generating module of a Trusted Party and securely transferred to the key-pair owner's 197 cryptographic module). 198
If a private key is ever output from a cryptographic module, the key shall be output and transferred 199 in a form and manner that provides appropriate assurance 20 of its confidentiality and integrity (e.g., 200
using manual methods and multi-party control procedures or automated key-transport methods). 201
The protection shall provide appropriate assurance that only the key-pair owner and/or the party 202 that generated the key pair will be able to determine the value of the plaintext private key (e.g., the 203 confidentiality and integrity protection for the private key uses a cryptographic mechanism that is 204 at least as strong as the (maximum) security strength that must be supported by the asymmetric-205 key algorithm that will use the private key). 206
The public key of a key pair may be made public. However, it shall be distributed and verified in 207 a manner that assures its integrity and association with the key-pair owner (e.g., in the case of a 208 static public key, this may be accomplished using an X.509 certificate that provides a level of 209 cryptographic protection that is at least as strong as the security strength associated with the key 210 pair). 211
Key Pair Replacement 212
Key pairs need to be replaced if the private key is compromised. Key pairs also need to be replaced 213 occasionally to limit the amount of information that is protected by the key pair in case of a 214 compromise of the private key (see Section 5.3 of SP 800-57, Part 1). Section 5.3.4 of SP 800-57, 215
Part 1 discusses the usage period for each key of the key pair for both digital signature and key-216 establishment key pairs. 217
When asymmetric key pairs need to be replaced, they shall be generated and distributed as 218 specified in Sections 5.1, 5.2, or 5.3, as appropriate. 219
6
Generation of Keys for Symmetric-Key Algorithms 220 Symmetric-key algorithms use the same (secret) key to both apply cryptographic protection to 221 information 21 and to remove or verify the protection. 22 Keys used with symmetric-key algorithms 222 must be known by only the entities authorized to apply, remove, or verify the protection and are 223 commonly known as secret keys. A secret key is often known by multiple entities that are said to 224 share or own the secret key, although it is not uncommon for a key to be generated, owned, and 225
used by a single entity (e.g., for secure storage). A secret key shall be generated by: 226
• One or more of the entities that will share the key, or 227
• A Trusted Party that provides the key to the intended sharing entities in a secure manner. 228
The Trusted Party must be trusted (by all entities that will share the key) not to disclose 229
the key to unauthorized parties or otherwise misuse the key (see SP 800-71 23 ). 230
A symmetric key K could be used, for example, to: 231
• Encrypt and decrypt data in an appropriate mode (e.g., using AES in the CTR mode, as 232 specified in FIPS 197 and SP 800-38A), 233
• Generate Message Authentication Codes (e.g., using AES in the CMAC mode, as 234 specified in FIPS 197 and SP 800-38B; HMAC, as specified in FIPS 198; or KMAC, as 235 specified in SP 800-185), or 236
• Derive additional keys using a key-derivation function specified in SP 800-108, where K 237 is the pre-shared (i.e., pre-existing) key that is used as the key-derivation key (e.g., K could 238 be a value of B generated as specified in Section 4). 239 Section 6.1 discusses the generation of symmetric keys that are obtained from the output of an 240 RBG. Section 6.2 discusses the derivation of symmetric keys. Section 6.3 specifies approved 241 techniques for combining a symmetric key with other symmetric keys and/or additional data. 242
At some point, a symmetric key needs to be replaced for a number of possible reasons (e.g., its 243 cryptoperiod has been exceeded, or it has been compromised; see SP 800-57 Part 1). Section 6.4 244 discusses key replacement. 245
6.1
The "Direct Generation" of Symmetric Keys 246 Symmetric keys that are to be directly generated from the output of an RBG shall be generated as 247 specified in Section 4, where B is used as the desired key K. The length of the key to be generated 248 depends on the length requirement of the application or algorithm with which the key is used and 249 the security strength to be supported. See SP 800-57, Part 1 for discussions on key lengths and the 250 (maximum) security strengths supported by symmetric-key algorithms and their keys. 251
Derivation of Symmetric Keys 252
Symmetric keys are often obtained from the output of an approved key-derivation method 253 (KDM), which is a cryptographic process specifically designed to transform secret input values 254 into bit strings that can be parsed into cryptographic keys and/or other secret keying material. 255
Approved KDMs have been constructed from more basic cryptographic components, such as an 256
approved hash function, as specified in FIPS 180 or FIPS 202; HMAC (using an approved hash 257 function), as specified in FIPS 198; AES-CMAC, as specified in FIPS 197 and SP 800-38B; or a 258 KMAC variant, as specified in SP 800-185. 259
Depending on the application and the KDM, the input to a KDM may include, for example, one 260 or more of the following: 261
• A shared secret value produced during the execution of a key-agreement scheme; 262
• A cryptographic key (i.e., a key-derivation key (KDK)); 263
• A password or passphrase; 264
• A salt value, which may be secret or non-secret, fixed, or randomly selected; 265
• A nonce (including RBG output) that may, for example, indicate the algorithm to be 266 associated with the key (e.g., AES), the use of the key (e.g., email), or any other 267 information that may be useful for associating a particular execution of the KDM with the 268 key(s) to be derived. 269
Approved key-derivation methods can be divided into two categories: 270
1) The first category consists of one-step key-derivation methods, which are usually called 271 key-derivation functions (KDFs). General-purpose KDFs are based on pseudorandom 272 functions (PRFs) that use a KDK (and other input) to generate additional keys (see SP 800-273 108). Some special-purpose KDFs, which are employed only as components of key-274 agreement schemes, are used to obtain keying material from the shared secrets produced 275 during the execution of such schemes (see SP 800-56C and SP 800-135); other special-276
purpose KDFs are to be used only for password-based protection of stored data and/or the 277 keys that protect that data (see SP 800-132). 278
2) The second category consists of extraction-then-expansion key-derivation procedures that 279 involve two steps: 280 a. Randomness extraction to obtain a single cryptographic key-derivation key. The 281 extraction of a KDK from a shared secret produced during the execution of a key-282 agreement scheme is described in SP 800-56C. The HMAC-based extraction of a 283
symmetric key from the concatenation of pre-existing symmetric keys (and, 284 perhaps, other data) is described in Section 6.3 (along with other methods of 285 combining preexisting keys to form a new key). The key resulting from a key-286 extraction process can be used as a KDK for key expansion. 287 b. Key expansion to derive keying material from 1) the key-derivation key produced 288 during randomness extraction and 2) other information, as specified in SP 800-289 56C 24 and SP 800-108. 290
Symmetric Keys Generated Using Key-Agreement Schemes 291
When an approved key-agreement scheme is available within an entity's key-generating module, 292 a symmetric key may be established with another entity that has the same capability. This process 293 results in a symmetric key that is shared between the two entities participating in the key-294 agreement transaction. 295 SP 800-56A and SP 800-56B provide several methods for pairwise key agreement. Asymmetric 296 key-agreement keys are used with a key-agreement primitive algorithm to generate a shared secret. 297
The shared secret is provided to a key-derivation method to derive keying material. SP 800-56C 298 specifies approved key-derivation methods for the key-agreement schemes in SP 800-56A and 299 SP 800-56B. 300
The maximum security strength that can be supported by a key derived in this manner is dependent 301 on: 1) the security strength supported by the asymmetric key pairs (as used during key 302 establishment), 2) the key-derivation method used, 3) the length of the derived key, and 4) the 303 algorithm with which the derived key will be used. See SP 800-57, Part 1. 304
Symmetric Keys Derived from a Pre-existing Key 305
Symmetric keys are often derived using a key-derivation function (KDF) and a preexisting key 306 known as a key-derivation key. For example, the preexisting key may have been: 307
• Generated from an approved RBG (see Section 4) and distributed as specified in Section 308 6.4; 309
• Agreed upon using a key-agreement scheme (see Section 6.2.1); 310
• Derived using a KDF and a (different) preexisting key as specified in SP 800-108; or 311
• The concatenation of multiple cryptographic keys (and, perhaps, other data) as described 312
in Section 6.3. 313
Approved methods for key derivation are provided in SP 800-108, which specifies approved 314
KDFs for deriving keys from a pre-shared (i.e., preexisting) key-derivation key. The KDFs are 315 based on HMAC (as specified in FIPS 198) and CMAC (as specified in SP 800-38B). 316
If the derived keys need to be distributed to other entities, this may be accomplished as discussed 317
in Section 6.4. 318
In addition to the symmetric-key algorithm with which a derived key will be used, the security 319 strength that can be supported by the derived key depends on the security strength supported by 320
the key-derivation key and the KDF used (see SP 800-57, Part 1 for the maximum security strength 321 that can be supported by HMAC and CMAC, and see SP 800-107 25 for further discussions about 322 the security strength of HMAC). 323
Symmetric Keys Derived from Passwords 324
In a number of popular applications, keys are generated from passwords. This is a questionable 325 practice since passwords are usually selected using methods that provide very little entropy (i.e., 326 randomness) and are, therefore, easily guessed. However, approved methods for deriving keys 327 from passwords for storage applications 26 are provided in SP 800-132. For these applications, users 328 are strongly advised to select passwords using methods that provide a very large amount of 329 entropy. 330
When a key is generated from a password, the entropy provided (and thus, the maximum security 331 strength that can be supported by the generated key) shall be considered to be zero unless the 332 password is generated using an approved RBG. In this case, the security strength that can be 333 supported by the password (password_strength) is no greater than the minimum of the security 334 strength supported by the RBG (RBG_strength) and the actual number of bits of RBG output 335
(RBG_outlen) used in the password. That is, password_strength ≤ min(RBG_strength, 336
RBG_outlen). 337
Symmetric Keys Produced by Combining (Multiple) Keys and Other Data 338
When symmetric keys K1, …, Kn are generated and/or established independently, they may be 339 combined within a key-generating module to form a key K. Other items of data (D1, …, Dm) can 340 also be combined with the Ki to form K under the conditions specified below. Note that while the 341
Ki values are required to be secret, the Di values need not be kept secret. 342
The component symmetric keys shall be generated and/or established independently (and 343 subsequently protected as necessary) using approved methods 27 that support a security strength 344 that is equal to or greater than the targeted security strength of the algorithm or application that 345 will rely on the output key K. Each component key shall be kept secret and shall not be used for 346 any purpose other than the computation of a specific symmetric key K (i.e., a given component 347 key shall not be used to generate more than one key). When a compromised key is replaced, the new key shall be generated in a manner that provides 433 assurance of its independence from the compromised key. The new key may be generated using 434 any appropriate method in Section 6 with the following restrictions: 435 1. The method used shall provide assurance that there is no feasibly detectable relationship 436 between the new key and the compromised key. To that end, the new key shall not be 437 derived or updated using the compromised key. 438 2. If the compromised key was generated in a manner that depended (in whole or in part) on 439 a password (see Sections 6.2.3), then that password shall be changed prior to the generation 440 of any new key; in particular, the new key(s) shall be generated in a manner that is 441 independent of the old password value. 442
If an uncompromised symmetric key is to be replaced, it shall be replaced using any method in 443
Section 6 that supports the required amount of security strength. However, if the key to be replaced 444 was generated in a manner that depended (in whole or in part) on a password (see Sections 6.2.3), 445 that password shall be changed prior to the generation of the new key. 446
